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Sunt verba rerum: the pragmatic life 
of words
Jacob L. Mey1,2*
Abstract 
Pragmatics is not about language as such, viewed in isolation, but about words as they are being used. And words are 
never things, pure objects; words have their history and lives: their story is the story of their users. Pragmatic thinking 
focuses not just on what ‘is’ there (the ‘essentialist’ method of linguistics), but on how what ‘is’ there, ‘got’ there, and 
what it ‘does’ there, in a ‘functionalist’ approach, characteristic of pragmatics. Such a functional approach relies heavily 
on the processes that are material in creating the conditions for words to be used in a particular way: both those pro-
cesses we normally call ‘historical’ (the history of what has been) and those that are characteristic for what happens 
in our own times: the pragmatic life of words. I will illustrate these reflections by focusing on a series of well-known 
linguistic phenomena, first of all the historical ‘emptying’ of content known as ‘semantic bleaching’, and second the 
transformation of the ways words function, commonly known under the name of ‘grammaticalization’ or ‘grammatici-
zation’. To better understand these processes, I will first focus on what I call the ‘historical bias’ of structuralist linguis-
tics, including a brief discussion of issues having to do with language development and how linguists and historians 
traditionally have tried to deal with this.
© 2016 The Author(s). This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, 
and indicate if changes were made.
On history and function
A first observation is that ‘history’ and ‘function’ often 
are interpreted in different ways; and that in particu-
lar, ‘history’ is seen as the history of wars and kings and 
things linguistic, while ‘functional’ often is narrowly mis-
interpreted as ‘that which functions within the confines 
of some grammatical description’. Here Antoine Meillet, 
the great historical linguist, tells us that such an attitude 
is basically wrong: history is social; it is more than just 
the history of things, even if those ‘things’ happen to be 
words.
Here Virgil’s immortal phrase, which I have adapted 
slightly to fit my purpose, has it right: sunt verba rerum, 
words are for a reason’, and they have to be spoken for 
a reason: in other words, they have to have a func-
tion. Moreover, they should not be spoken, as in Virgil’s 
story of Aeneas, just ‘to a queen’ (infandum, regina…), 
but to all of humanity, to the great community of lan-
guage users. (‘Sunt verba rerum: the pragmatic life of 
words’—freely after Virgil, Aeneid I: 462: Sunt lacrymae 
rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt ‘Tears are for a rea-
son: being mortal breaks the heart’; my translation).
This amounts to saying that history, in particular the 
history of words and their lives, is pragmatic: it takes the 
users of the words and their society into full account for 
the description of their functions and the functions of the 
words they use. Here is what Meillet has to say on this 
in the Introduction à l’étude comparée des langues indo-
européennes (and had been saying ever since 1902, the 
year the book first came out):
“La langue n’existe qu’en vertu de la société: de 
même que les sociétés humaines ne sauraient exister 
sans langage”
‘Language does not exist except through society, just 
like the human societies could not exist without the 
use of language’ (1937: 18)
Note here in particular how Meillet carefully distin-
guishes between ‘langue’, the object of linguistic descrip-
tion (a description which for him was mainly historical) 
and ‘langage’, language as it is used, as it functions. The 
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latter is the foundation of society, that is, it is both the 
historical and the continued precondition of society’s 
existence; it is also the proper object of pragmatic stud-
ies. So let’s make a little excursus into history and see 
what we can learn about language use from that.
History of things and history of language
Over the centuries, there have been a number of views 
on history, both of events and people, and of languages. 
Just to name a few early trends, along with their language 
parallels:
  • anecdotal (Herodotus’ Histories)
language parallels: word collecting, word lists, anec-
dotes etc.
  • instructive (Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War)
language parallel: etymology, exegesis, analogy, edu-
cational use, grammatical correctness (rhetors)
  • pragmatic (Xenophon’s Kyroupaideía, Caesar’s De 
bello gallico)
language parallel: discourse, argumentation, rhetoric 
(Sophists)
  • philosophical (Lucretius’ De natura deorum, Plato’s 
myths)
language parallel: origin of words (Plato’s Cratylos), 
the ‘real’ meaning of words (like in ‘etymo-logy’, the 
meaning of the ‘real’, the etymon)
  • linguistic (Johann Christoph Adelung & Johann 
Severin Vater’s Mithridates, a collection of language 
specimina, late 1700s-early 1800s)
language parallel: history of languages compar-
ing their development as ‘trees’ or families (Jakob 
Grimm’s Deutsche Grammatik; the later compara-
tive linguists: Rasmus Rask, Franz Bopp, August 
Schleicher and their successors until our own times)
The history of words
Documentary, history and story
It is often said that stories are different from documenta-
ries: a story is fiction, a documentary has to do with facts. 
A movie that is based on facts but poses as a documen-
tary is therefore an historical falsification.
To this, I would say that any writing is to a certain 
degree a ‘falsification’, in the sense that no writing can 
equal the facts as they have happened, because all writ-
ing (even of documentaries) presupposes a writer. When 
a story is written, the facts are altered: they are seen 
through the perspective of the writer and his or her his-
tory (or ‘herstory’, as some would prefer to say). The story 
of the writer overlays and undercuts the story of the 
history.
The problem here is that while we may be able to see 
stories as falsified history, we do not see History (with a 
capital H) as a collection of falsified stories. What hap-
pens in nationalistic history-writing is that a story takes 
over the facts (including the language) and becomes 
institutionalized as history. I will illustrate this with a 
piece of historicized story-telling, the (his)story of the 
American South.
The story of the south
There is currently a strong tendency to revise the history 
of the Civil War in America. First, there was of course the 
official history, of how the slaves were freed and how the 
North battled the South on humanitarian principles. This 
history was attacked by Southern writers who glorified 
the genteel living style of the plantation (think Gone with 
the wind) and stressed the fact that the black people were 
worse off after 1866 than before (which was partly true).
Subsequently, another deconstruction of history set in, 
according to which the whole war was a matter of eco-
nomic interest: the industrialized North needed cheap 
labor power to compete with the slave economy in the 
South; the slaves were set free to become the indus-
trial proletariat in cities like Chicago, whereto they 
were transported by the wagonload from Mississippi, 
to eke out a miserable existence in the slaughter houses 
and urban labor camps of their employer, the Armor 
company.
Without adjudicating claims to correctness (histori-
cal or factual) of any particular account, the point to be 
made here that one cannot write history without creating 
a story. If successful, then the story becomes history, until 
it in its turn is superseded by the next successful story. 
The most recent successful story then becomes History, 
capitalized. Rather than reviving history and learning 
from history in order not to repeat it (as George San-
tayana has taught us), we revise it in our own image to 
ensure that the repetition does not hurt, as was the case 
for the American South.
To take some more recent examples, for many people, 
Mozart is the one who wrote a piece called ‘Elvira Madi-
gan’: they associate his piano concerto #24 with the film 
whose main musical theme was taken from that work. 
Similarly, Steven Spielberg’s 2005 film Munich will prob-
ably become the authorized version of what happened at 
the Olympic Village in Munich in 1972, when Palestin-
ian terrorists kidnapped and killed eleven Israeli athletes, 
and themselves got killed in retaliation by the Israeli 
security forces.
Even the most faithful documentary cannot escape this 
historical fate. In another Spielberg movie, Schindler’s 
List, even though the film itself was not intended as a 
documentary, long stretches were purely actual historical 
footage; however, even these documentary parts became 
part of the story, and although they represented historical 
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facts, directly so to speak, they were not part of any 
objective history (as supposedly is the case in a docu-
mentary), but of the Spielberg story. For those who 
viewed the movie, however, Spielberg’s story has become 
history, because “that’s what happened in Auschwitz, and 
I have seen it myself”. One is reminded of Ronald Reagan, 
who once was asked if he would have handled the Iran 
hostage crisis1 different than Jimmy Carter did. His reply 
was: “I would just have gone in there—I’ve done it many 
times [read: as an actor].”
Now let’s apply this to the subject of language, and con-
sider how linguists treat facts and historical correctness.
Historical truth and linguistic facts I: the case 
of conversation analysis
Of truth and facts: ‘let the facts speak’
There is a story about an American linguistics professor 
from the sixties, who sent one of his students to do field-
work in Central America, among a tribe where he himself 
had spent some of his formative years. When the student 
came back, the professor’s first question was: “Did you 
get the language?”
What this question really is about, is whether the stu-
dent got everything that counted as a linguistic fact. The 
professor was not particularly interested in what the stu-
dent had experienced as a ‘displaced person’ in the jungle, 
nor in what the natives considered a ‘linguistic fact’ (by 
what is usually called ‘folk linguistics’), nor in what kind 
of linguistic and other customs the natives might have in 
dealing with major life events such as births, deaths, and 
other ‘rites of passage’. The slogan ‘Let the facts speak’ 
was only applicable to honest-to-God linguistic facts.
With a take-off on the well-known judiciary formula 
‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’, one 
could say that the idea of getting ‘the language, the whole 
language, and nothing but the language’ has been popu-
lar among linguists for most of the science’s history (just 
as its venerable counterpart has been in the courtrooms 
of justice).
Facts and conversation
A peculiar variant of this belief in ‘facts’ and this prac-
tice of ‘fact-finding’ is encountered in language-based 
sociological analyses of the conversation analysis (CA) 
type. Here, if anywhere, the facts are supposed to ‘speak 
for themselves’: speakers’ utterances are faithfully moni-
tored, and transcribed in great detail; in addition, now 
that we can easily capture human behavior on video, 
1 In 1985, a number of US diplomats were kept under siege in the Tehran 
embassy for many months and were only liberated after humiliating nego-
tiations.
also gestures and facial expressions are included in those 
facts. The analyst’s task its to render those facts as faith-
fully as possible, without introducing any preconceived 
ideas. Any interpretation should ‘emerge’ from the facts: 
we only have to give the facts a voice so they can ‘speak 
for themselves’.
Of course, this is all metaphorical: nobody has ever 
seen a fact open its mouth and speak. But to enable that 
fact to ‘speak’ (whatever that means), the voice of the ana-
lyst should be muted or even eliminated from the record: 
he or she is just a conduit, the means by which the fact 
may be communicated and analyzed, having become 
transparent in the linguist’s transcription.
What those conversational fact-hunters never seem to 
realize is that finding their isolated, disembodied facts is 
not the only, and certainly not the most important part 
of the description process. Finding ‘facts’ is like taking 
photographs or stills, a snapshot that freezes the histori-
cal movement. But even the most advanced techniques, 
such as movie or video recording, complete with color 
and sound, have their own limitations, which are often 
not realized as such. A movie is not just a collections 
of stills put together to resemble motion (the original 
name of the technique of ‘motion pictures’): the pictures 
themselves are not nearly as important as are the tech-
niques of assembling, sequencing, and cutting the scenes 
into a film. What we see when watching a movie is not a 
recording of reality, but an interpretation of some theme 
or story, offered us through the medium of the pictorial 
material, arranged in such a way as to reflect the direc-
tor/moviemaker’s ‘story of the story’ in which we see the 
facts as obeying a particular order: chronological, final, 
or causal.
A further important perspective of this composition 
is that of choice. Long before a movie is put together, 
the original selection has taken place: the moviemaker 
must determine which of the frames are going to be used 
where, and which not; in addition, he or she must decide 
on how each sequence of pictures is going to be put in 
relation to the other sequences. All these decisions are 
the director’s alone, and he or she determines what the 
movie, in the final instance is going to be. In other words, 
movies are fiction, even if they claim to, or in fact do, rep-
resent reality (as in the case of documentaries, pseudo- 
or real).
Something similar happens in CA, where the analyst 
has to make a choice among the endless hours of taped 
(and transcribed) conversation that are at his or her dis-
posal. Here I want to emphasize, first, that the transcrip-
tion itself is not a fact of speech, but an artifact of history: 
no two transcriptions are the same, no matter how hard 
one tries to standardize the conventions. But even more 
important is the way of selecting the material to be used 
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in the analysis. This is by no mean an irrelevant or trivial 
matter: just as the skillful defense lawyer can select and 
arrange the facts of the case so as to picture the events in 
a way that is most favorable to his client, so too the con-
versation analyst ‘proves’ his or her point by selectively 
choosing among the raw material of transcribed speech. 
In the case of film making, one could say (varying the old 
proverb, C’est le ton qui fait la musique) that ‘it is the cut-
ting that makes the movie’; similarly, in CA, it’s the selec-
tion that makes the analysis. In both cases, we have to 
take the cutter, respectively the analyst into account; their 
voices can never be entirely subdued. While pretending 
to objectively describe and neutrally analyze the histori-
cal event of a conversation, what conversation analysis 
produces is not history, but a story, neither more nor less.
Historical truth and linguistic facts II: semantic 
‘emptying’ (often called ‘bleaching’) and pragmatic 
misunderstanding
Semantic ‘bleaching’
But the story does not end here. In the study of language 
in general (not just in CA), what we are dealing with is 
not a description of static, historical ‘facts’ or events, but 
rather, the realization of an historical tendency, a stream 
of ever-changing events that interlace and embrace, 
imbricate and reinforce one another. Over time, these 
events (expressed as they often are in words of a story, or 
quotes from a source) become solidified in their imbrica-
tions, such that it becomes almost impossible to under-
stand them as they were originally meant. But then again, 
neither is what they originally meant, the same as what 
they mean today.
Over time, words lose their meaning. Nobody thinks of 
‘sails’, when a decidedly sail-less vessel (such as an atom-
ically-powered submarine) is said to be ‘sailing’ from its 
base in Connecticut to some undisclosed destination in 
the Middle East. But there are contexts in which an origi-
nal meaning seems to be kept, while it in reality is lost; 
the ‘keeping’ masks an act of thievery on the part of an 
outside agency such as a government, a political party, a 
religious authority, and so on. This ‘emptying’ of meaning 
is sometimes called ‘semantic bleaching’: the words lose 
their colors, fade, as garments do when they are exposed 
to direct sunlight over time. The next section will give 
some examples.
‘Blessed he who comes in the name of the lord…’
In the Roman Catholic Mass, the chanting of Sanc-
tus Sanctus Sanctus ‘Holy Holy Holy’ is followed by the 
words Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini, usually 
translated as ‘Blessed he that cometh in the name of the 
Lord’. The text refers to an episode from the New Testa-
ment, where Jesus enters the Holy City with his Apostles 
on what is now called Palm Sunday. The words are the 
welcome greetings that the inhabitants of Jerusalem prof-
fered on the occasion of the triumphant entry of one they 
thought might be the long-awaited Messiah; the words 
‘Blessed he that cometh in the name of the Lord’, as found 
in St. Matthew 21:9 (King James Version) are actually 
themselves a quote from the Old Testament, where they 
occur in Psalm 118:26. In this way, the invocation has 
been doubly or triply codified as belonging to the sacred 
sphere of Church and Scripture. And this is precisely 
where pragmatic misunderstandings due to ‘bleaching’ 
come into the picture. Consider the following.
On entering an airplane belonging to Continental Air-
lines and after being seated, one used to be treated to var-
ious linguistic variants of the standard formula ‘Welcome 
aboard’. The different languages are ranked alphabetically, 
and when the letter H comes up, we see a Hebrew display 
with the text Barukhim Ha-ba’im’ ‘Welcome they who 
(have) come’. Except for the part that is missing, ‘in the 
name of the Lord’ (which would be slightly less suitable 
in the present situation), the text is identical to the one in 
Matthew 21.
Here’s another example. On entering the settlement Tel 
Qatifa, which used to be situated in the Gaza strip prior 
to its forced evacuation in 2005, one was greeted by a big 
sign saying Barukhim ha-ba’im leTel-Qatifa ‘Welcome to 
Tel-Qatifa’. Again, the literal translation would be very 
similar to the one used in the religious context: ‘Blessed 
they who have come’, but evidently no such connotation 
was present in the minds of the settlers who put up the 
sign.2 In other words, the Continental Airlines welcom-
ing formula is a common Hebrew phrase, both in Jesus’ 
times and in our own, and the hieratic connotations that 
we attribute to the ecclesiastical chant are by no means 
inherent in the words themselves, but have become iden-
tified with them over time in a particular type of reli-
giously authorized use.
It follows that a correct pragmatic interpretation of 
such formulae should take into account both the cir-
cumstances of use and the way this use has developed. 
When the Jerusalem Jews, on the Sunday before that fate-
ful Pesach, chanted ‘Blessed he who comes in the name 
of the Lord’, they were using a simple form of welcom-
ing expression, one that is in use even in the Hebrew lan-
guage today. And (to consider another Biblical instance of 
the same phenomenon), when Jesus talks about himself 
as the ‘Son of Man’, this is no exalted reference to some 
2 The Hebrew version of Matthew 21:9 has Barukh ha-ba’ ‘Blessed he who 
comes’, a formula identical (except for the singular form) to the one used in 
the Continental Airlines and the Tel Qatifa greetings. Incidentally, the pic-
ture with the sign was brought by the Danish free tabloid Urban on March 
3, 2006, in a totally different and inappropriate context.
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higher qualities he might possess in virtue of his being 
human, but simply a way of referring to himself by way 
of a modest ‘third person’ (in the same way as the Czechs 
may refer to themselves by the substantive člověk, as in 
člověk nikdy neví ‘one never knows’. In much the same 
way, the Germans utilize their ‘universal pronoun’ man as 
in Man weiß nie, similar to the Norwegian use of en, as in 
en vet aldri; other languages (such as Italian or Spanish) 
use an impersonal third person reflexive verb: non si sa 
mai, nunca se sabe ‘You never know’.
Historical truth and linguistic facts III: 
grammaticalization
Whatever happened to Latin?
The last example I quoted above demonstrates yet 
another tendency that is of interest to pragmatics, seen in 
an historical perspective: that of grammaticalization (or 
grammaticization, as it is also called). The famous French 
comparative linguist Meillet (1866–1936) has described 
this phenomenon as follows:
“Des mots, d’abord autonomes, se réduisent par 
l’usage à n’être plus que des éléments grammaticaux: 
en latin, habeo avait toute sa valeur dans habeo 
aliquid factum; mais, par l’effet de la répétition, j’ai 
de fr. j’ai fait a perdu progressivement toute autono-
mie; trois termes autrefois indépendants (ego, habeo 
et factum) qui ont abouti à fr. j’ai fait ne constituent 
plus aujourd’hui qu’une forme grammaticale équiv-
alente à lat. feci et qui n’a pas plus de valeur expres-
sive. Les mots deviennent ainsi des éléments 
grammaticaux,…”
‘Originally autonomous words, in the course of their 
usage, are becoming just grammatical elements: in 
Latin, habeo had all of its value in habeo aliquid 
factum; but, by dint of repetition, j’ai in the French 
j’ai fait has gradually lost all autonomy; the three 
erstwhile independent terms (ego, habeo et factum) 
that have resulted in French j’ai fait, today no longer 
constitute anything but a grammatical form that 
is equivalent to the Latin feci; it has no longer any 
expressive valor. In this way, words become gram-
matical elements,…’ (Introduction, p. 20; italics 
original, boldface mine)
It is well known (as Meillet underscores several times 
in the work quoted here) that languages are very different 
with regard to morphological complexity. Even within 
the same family, we see immense variations over time 
and space, from morphologically complicated languages 
like Sanskrit, where a single verb may have more than 350 
distinct forms, to English, where the role of morphology 
in syntax has been reduced to an almost ‘Chinese-like’ 
level.
Similarly, there is a great variation among different 
languages as to the number and specifications of certain 
word classes; for instance, while verbs and nouns are 
properly distinguished in a language like Latin, the dis-
tinction is more blurred in English, such that verbs can 
become nouns and (more frequently) nouns may become 
verbs at a moment’s notice, so to speak (cf. ‘to OD on 
something’, from the substantive ‘overdose’, abbreviated 
‘OD’).
The next section will deal with a particular morpholog-
ical phenomenon, that of case and its descriptive vagaries 
in Indo-European.
The case of case
The most common cases of grammaticalization occur in 
connection with the rise and fall of case systems. As we 
know, some languages excel in cases (some Caucasian 
languages, such as Lak or Tabassaran, sport up to fifty of 
them; Finnish has at least 14, maybe even 16, depending 
on how one counts them). Other languages, especially the 
older ones in the Indo-European family, have more mod-
est, although still impressive inventories: Sanskrit with its 
eight, most Slavic language with their seven, Latin with 
its six, and Greek with its five cases are among the best 
known instances. But even a modern language such as 
German still can boast of having four cases, something 
which seems like a quaint anomaly in this neck of the lin-
guistic woods, where all its close relatives and neighbors 
have shed the casual garb a long time ago (there are rem-
nants of cases in both English, Dutch, and the Scandina-
vian languages, but these represent isolated or ‘petrified’ 
forms, the so called ‘genitive’ -s being among the former, 
the ‘dative’ ending -e, as in the Danish i levende live ‘in 
living [actual] life’, among the latter.
Above, I put the names of those ‘cases’ in scare quotes, 
meant to alert my readers to the fact that there was 
something uncommon in the way I was using the terms 
‘genitive’ and ‘dative’). The next section explains why.
Case as a category: a structuralist katzenjammer
During my linguistic apprenticeship in Copenhagen 
under the direction of the celebrated Louis Hjelmslev 
(1899–1965), one of the most zealously defended tenets 
of the extreme structuralist brand of linguistics known 
as ‘glossematics’ was that one never should indulge in 
‘squinting grammar’. This term, whose origin goes back to 
another famous Danish linguist, Otto Jespersen, was used 
to methodologically disqualify those linguists who looked 
at one language when describing another. Typically, this 
was the case in what used to be called ‘school grammar’, 
where the Latin terms for the various cases (nominative, 
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accusative, and so on) were uncritically transferred to 
languages that either had no such morphological forma-
tions (or at most, very few). This was how the English, 
Scandinavian, or German substantive forms ending in -s, 
came to be called ‘genitives’, whereas pronominal forms 
such as English me, Danish mig, Norwegian meg, Ger-
man mir and mich could be described as either datives or 
accusatives, inasmuch as they corresponded to the Latin 
and Greek forms with the same function: mihi or me, (e)
moi or (e)me.
Now what was wrong, according to the structuralists, 
with naming a case that functioned as a dative, a ‘dative’, 
and one that functioned as an accusative, an ‘accusative’? 
After all, as they say in Texas, “if it looks like a snake, 
moves like a snake, and strikes like a snake, then it prob-
ably is a snake”. However, the structuralists didn’t see it 
that way.
According to the axiom adopted by glossematics as 
well as by other schools of structuralist linguistics, there 
should be a strict correspondence between content and 
expression. Thus, a linguistic unit should be marked mor-
phologically as a case in order to qualify for case status. 
Conversely, if a linguistic unit shows ‘case-like’ behavior 
(e.g. in its morphology or syntax) and can be assigned a 
‘case-like’ content, then it has to be included among the 
number of cases in the language. If this two-way corre-
spondence of content and expression was not in place, 
then we could not bestow the respective structural label 
on the linguistic unit in question.
Inventorying case
The strict structuralist position results in some strange 
case inventories (for languages that do have cases, in the 
sense defined above) and some uncomfortable alterna-
tives for those who want to obey the structuralists’ stric-
tures in describing a language. As to the former, consider 
the inventory for Latin that we, Hjelmslev’s students in 
the fifties, arrived at during the seminars on ‘case’ [mostly 
based on Hjelmslev’s account of the phenomenon in his 
two volumes from the mid-thirties, La catégorie des cas 
I & II; Hjelmslev (1934, 1936)]. For Latin, the rules pre-
scribed the inclusion of such rare forms as statim ‘imme-
diately’ (from status’ ‘stood’ (participle), separatim ‘apart 
from’ (from separatus ‘separated’), or passim ‘everywhere’ 
(from passus ‘step’). Here, as everywhere, a minor prob-
lem was how to give such isolated occurrences a proper 
‘casual’ name (e.g. an ‘expansive’?); much worse was our 
agony over how to distinguish forms like passim, statim 
from bona fide adverbs of time and place (that, inci-
dentally, also at one time might have been cases, cf. cito 
‘quickly’, presumably the ablative of citus—but then what 
about porro, retro, frustra and all the other adverbs end-
ing in long -a or-o?)
However, such objections were never taken seriously by 
the Master, and I even got a maybe deserved chiding in 
front of the class for my obstinacy and stubbornness, 
when I suggested that there was something wrong with a 
reasoning that would have us consider regular adverbial 
forms like Latin unde’ from where?’, inde ‘from there, 
then’, deinde ‘from there, since then’, and so on, as obscure 
‘cases’, related somehow to the deictic or determinative 
pronoun is ‘the one there, the one just mentioned’. Or to 
take an example from Finnish: should ohitse ‘in passing’ 
be called an adverb (from ohi ‘past’), inflected for case? 
But adverbs are normally not inflected, so…3 On the 
other hand, Finnish (i)tse is itself a (semi-)productive suf-
fix: when added to a substantive, it produces an adverbial 
expression indicating the way along which something is 
happening; well-known examples are lentoteitse ‘by way 
of air’ (from lento ‘flight’ and tie ‘road’; the equivalent of 
‘By Air Mail’ on envelopes), puhelimitse ‘by phone’ (from 
puhelin ‘phone’), etc. But how to determine whether this 
a nominal case formation or an adverb?4
Of snakes and cases
To return to the matter of grammaticalization: when a 
linguistic form changes its role, or adapts itself to a previ-
ous, now defunct or dying, function by incorporating new 
material, should we then not allow the old appellation to 
remain intact? It strikes like a snake, so it is a snake; it 
functions as a dative, so it is a dative, no? In this vein, 
one could talk about a dative function in a language that 
no longer has (or never had) a dative, a bit like the roles 
that Fillmore developed in his early version of case gram-
mar, later more fully developed in all kinds of functional 
grammatical systems. A construction such as the Hindi N 
(or Pron) + ka (as in ap ka gulam hai ‘I am your servant’, 
(ap, respectful second person address form  +  ‘genitive’ 
particle −ka) would then be just as much of a genitive 
as the English N +  ‘s or the corresponding Scandinavian 
‘genitives’—not to speak of the German so-called ‘zweiter 
Fall’ (lit. ‘second case’)—in reality a pseudonym for the 
old term ‘genitive’).
But the protean character of linguistic entities shows 
itself not only in this type of strict grammaticalization 
3 And neither are particles, according to the strict historical-grammatical 
view. Gustav Meyer takes Homer to task for “erroneously” inflecting these 
suffixes: “er [Homer] flectiert irrtümlicherwise auch die Partikel” (Griechis-
che Grammatik, Leipzig 1888, 2nd ed. p. 395). The instance Meyer criticizes 
here is Odyssey 2:47: humîn toísdessi ‘to y’all who are here’.
4 The number of cases in Finnish is subject to dispute, and depends on who 
makes up the inventory (cf. also above). Auli Hakulinen, in her article on 
Finnish in the Elsevier Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 1st ed., 
Amsterdam and Oxford, 1994, speaks of 14, maybe 15 cases; Fred Karlsson, 
in the second edition of OUP’s International Encyclopedia of Linguistics, 
lists only 13.
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(‘the case of case’); linguistic units change form, function, 
or both at the same time in many other ways as well. The 
next section will deal with some functional changes.
Changing functions, changing forms: the definite 
article
For a pragmaticist, the strict morphological requirements 
of a case inventory in the structuralist tradition have very 
little to do with the way a language functions. Similarly, 
pragmatics prefers to define linguistic categories and the 
changes that they incur over time, using functional, not 
morphological criteria. Let me show you some examples 
of a category which is famous for its protean character: 
the article (definite or indefinite).
The Indo‑European definite article
The word class ‘article’ is absent in a number of Indo-
European languages such as Latin, Lithuanian, and the 
majority of the Slavic languages. The same is true for a 
number of unrelated languages such as Japanese, Chi-
nese, or Greenlandic Inuit; by contrast, it flourishes in 
Indo-European languages such as Greek, German, the 
Romance descendants of Latin, English, and so on. What 
is interesting is that this particular word class does not 
seem to be on the way to extinction or weakening; on the 
contrary, we see it emerge as a new development in vari-
ous geographically and linguistically very distinct loca-
tions, as I will show (below, in three parts).
Starting out with an overview of the situation in a card-
carrying ‘articulate’ language such as Classical Greek, I 
will examine the emergence of article-like categories of 
determiners in such unrelated languages as Czech and 
Finnish (with a little excursus into Chinese).
Part one: the classics
Right away I hear somebody protesting: But aren’t Czech, 
Finnish, and Chinese supposed to have no articles at all? 
And as for Greek itself, aren’t those so-called articles 
‘really’ some kind of determinative, or even demonstra-
tive pronouns?
With regard to Ancient Greek, the objection is valid: 
the article ho of the classical period is, historically, the 
same as the determinative/demonstrative hos; in the 
Homeric epics, the two are not clearly marked off against 
each other. Whenever needed, the demonstrative does 
duty (even if rarely, by our standards) as a definite article, 
or even as a relative pronoun.
For example, we find Tá en Pyloi ‘the things that hap-
pened in Pylos’ as the title of book 3 of the Odyssey; this 
tà is not really different (except functionally) from the tà 
used as the neuter plural article, as in tá t’álla (‘in other 
respects’, Zeus speaking to Hermes in Od. 5 :29, or from 
the same tà, used as a relative pronoun, as in heímata tá 
hoi póre dîa Kalypsó (ibid. 320, 371, etc.) ‘the garments 
that the lovely Calypso had provided him [Ulysses] with’.
Compare now that the Latin language, geographically 
and culturally, and even (albeit more remotely) linguisti-
cally close to Greek, kept its independence, article-wise, 
for all of its millennial life during which it managed to do 
without those pesky holdouts. Only much later, after the 
Classical and Vulgar Latin periods, we see the emergence 
of something like an article; the Medieval philosophers 
apparently felt it was necessary from time to time to indi-
cate definiteness when speculating about the notions of 
‘to be’ or ‘being’, letting the Latin expressions esse, ens, 
often be preceded by the borrowed Greek definite article 
in its singular neuter form: to ens, to esse. And of course, 
in the classical language’s various successors, in the tran-
sition from Vulgar Latin to the modern neo-Latin dia-
lects, a parallel development has created articles in all of 
them, albeit in different guises and constructions (French 
le, la, Spanish and Italian lo, la, with Portuguese coming 
full circle (almost) to the Classical Greek forms: o, a. (As 
to Romanian, it obeys the typological laws of its linguistic 
area, the Sprachbund, by putting the definite article at the 
end, cf. masc. -ul in om-ul ‘the man’).
Part two: Slavic, especially Czech
As to the Slavic languages, with the exception of Bulgar-
ian (which follows the areal imperative of its Sprachbund 
by letting the definite article follow the substantive, as 
do Romanian and Albanian), the rule is that there are no 
definite or indefinite articles. Speakers of languages such 
as Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak and so on experience 
infinite hardships when they wish to express themselves 
in a Western language such as English, which some-
times does, sometimes does not, require the presence of 
(mostly a definite) article.
Even so, there have been tendencies towards introduc-
ing an article-like preposed morpheme in Czech as early 
as the sixteenth century, and the tendency continues 
today. In the nineteenth century Czech writer Jan Ner-
uda’s immortal sketches from the Prague quarter called 
Malá Strana, in German Kleinseite, we meet two gentle-
men, about whom the author says:
“Přede všemi však zůstanou mně nezapomenutelni 
mužové dva, ti se vryli v srdce srdce mého. Pan 
Ryšánek a pan Schlegl…. Ti dva se nemohli ani cítit”. 
‘Above all, nevertheless, unforgettable remain for me 
two men, they [ti] have engraved themselves in my 
heart of heart[s]. Mr. Rysánek and Mr. Schlegl. The 
[ti] two could simply not stand each other”. (Povídky 
malostranské, Praha, Mladé Letá, 1960, p. 90; my 
translation)
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Here, we see how, similar to what is the case in 
Homeric Greek, the demonstrative pronoun ten (sing. 
masc.; plur. masc. ti) is used, on the one hand where we 
would expect a relative pronoun (my translation ‘they’ is 
somewhat clumsy: using the relative pronoun ‘who’ 
would give a much better result), and on the other as a 
kind of preposed definite article (‘the two’).5
To take a contemporary occurrence of the same phe-
nomenon, it has been pointed out that the Czech 
demonstrative ten, especially in combination with the 
superlative, is not only a possible, but indeed a necessary 
completion of the construction, as seen in the follow-
ing two minimal pairs, due to the UCLA linguist Kresin 
(2001, 2005):
To je to nejdůležitější/*To je nejdůležitější
(‘That’s the most important [thing]’)
To je ta nejdůležitější věc/To je nejdůležitější věc 
(‘That’s the most important thing.’) (Kresin 2005: 1)
Susan Kresin, to whom I am indebted for the above 
examples, concludes her observations as follows:
“This [first] minimal pair indicates that in the syn-
tactic construct to je X, in which X is a superla-
tive adjective, ten functions as an obligatory device 
of nominalization. In other words, the use of ten is 
grammatically determined by the mere existence 
of this syntactic construct—an indication of its full 
grammaticalization in this particular context.” 
(2005: 1) my emphasis)
Compare also the following extract from a contempo-
rary Czech novelist (as quoted in Kresin, ibid.):
… má máma nekdy trojcila, jako by na celym svete 
chodila do rachoty akorát ona sama a ostatní 
se flákali a lezeli drzkou na slunícku. Jo, zacala 
byt taková, ze mela tu nejtezsí drínu, tu nejvetsí 
otrocinu za nejmín prachu.
‘My mother sometimes carried on about how only she 
in the whole world had to go to work, and everyone else 
just bummed around and lay in the sun. She started to act 
as if she had the heaviest load, the greatest slave-work for 
the least amount of money.’ (Václav Dusek, Tuláci)
To this, I would like to add an observation from my 
own experience as a part-time speaker of Czech. When 
my wife and I lived in Prague in the sixties, my first job 
in the morning would be to go across the street from 
the dormitory where we lived, and get the indispensa-
ble housky for our breakfast. The manager of the small 
5 The translation ‘these two’ would be possible as well, but strikes me as 
maybe a little too emphatic.
convenience store where I used to shop for these things, 
a Mr. Karel Vlk, would invariably greet me with the 
words
A co si preje ten soudruh?
literally translated as:
‘And what does the comrade wish for?’
This was of course in the days of the ‘third’ (some would 
call it the ‘fourth’) republic; today, Mr. Vlk’s successor 
would probably not address me as ‘comrade’, but as ‘gen-
tleman’, pán, but that’s beside the point—the point being 
that he used the demonstrative pronoun ten, grammati-
calized to the status and function of an article. A correct 
English translation would be: ‘What does the gentleman 
want?’; in Danish (or Norwegian), one would say, in the 
same fashion, “Hva(d) ønsker herren?”
On another occasion, the woman cashier in the Charles 
University menza, or cafeteria, having suffered through 
my complaints about the lousy food served there, replied 
with a characteristic Pragueian shrug (pointing her 
thumb in the direction of the military academy next door, 
which got their meals from the same outlet):
“Ti generalové to zerou!”
that is, literally, ‘The generals fucking eat it!’ (with a 
deprecating verb, Czech zrát, that lacks a strict English 
counterpart (cf. German fressen, Danish æde); again, the 
demonstrative ti is used as an article here).
Often, the emerging article used in this fashion still 
connotes something of the original certain distance from 
the speaker, as we saw in the previous example; compare 
also the angry remark made to my wife when she tried to 
sneak into a long line waiting for the always elusive bram-
bory (potatoes):
“Hele hele ta paní, fronta je tady!”
‘Wait a minute the lady, the line begins here!’
Part three: Finnish
In Finnish, the tendency to ‘de-functionalize’ the demon-
strative follows roughly the same path as we have seen 
for Czech. The negative connotations attached to the 
demonstrative (or better, determinative) se reflect a gen-
eral aversion to the use of pronouns when referring to 
persons of distinction, reserving them for reference to 
equals or lower-placed individuals. A similar tendency 
is found in other language communities; in my Dutch-
speaking family, for example, it was absolutely forbid-
den to refer to Dad as ‘he’, and the Swedish restrictions 
on the corresponding form (specially when used as a 
form of address) are well-known. The earlier, German-
inspired Danish military manuals contained explicit 
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sanctions against privates addressing their superiors 
inappropriately in this way; conversely, the Copenhagen 
police force used to be able to clamp a person in jail for 
addressing an officer with the 3d person singular mascu-
line han.
Early in my Finnish life, I was instructed by my friends 
never to ask to speak to, or identify, a person on the tel-
ephone using the determinative pronoun se (literally ‘this’ 
in the sense of ‘the one closest in the context, the one just 
mentioned’, etc.) Thus, one should not literally translate 
an English ‘identifying’ question such as ‘Is that Profes-
sor Itkonen?’ by saying Onko se professori Itkonen?, but 
just drop the offending pronoun and ask Onko professori 
Itkonen?, thereby also conforming with the grammarians’ 
preference for pronoun-dropping with verbs.
Here, the vox populi shows a tendency to the contrary: 
pronouns are routinely used with finite verb forms, even 
though not ‘strictly’ needed; this is by now pretty per-
vasive trend, at least in the spoken language. But even 
in older times, the use of se normally would impart a 
rather impolite flavor, as e.g. in se vanha piiantaimi ‘that 
old dried-out biddy’ (literally, ‘an ‘(old) maid cactus’; the 
expression is found in the classical popular comedy Num-
misuutarit (‘The village cobblers’) by the nineteenth-cen-
tury author Alexis Kivi.
Otherwise, the fate of Finnish se has taken it in a some-
what different direction from the corresponding Czech 
pronoun. Actually, se is now used across the board in the 
spoken language as a replacement for the ‘real’ pronoun 
hän ‘he/she’ (Finnish does not have grammatical gender, 
such that the pronoun hän is ‘born’ politically correct, 
corresponding to the English written form ‘s/he’). Com-
pare the following stretch of informal dinner table con-
versation between parents and their son. The question is 
about a cousin who has been traveling, and whether he 
will remember to bring back some present for the 11-year 
old boy.
FATHER: lupasiko se tuoda sulle tuliaisia?
Did he promise to bring you some presents?
CHILD: 0 [=! nods].
FATHER: millaisia?
What kind?
CHILD: se sanoi että se keksii sitten.
He said that he will think of something later.
FATHER: keksii jotakin.
He will think of something.
(Adapted from Tryggvason 2006)
In this excerpt, we see how the pronoun that agrees 
with the verb in lines 5 and 8 is not the expected personal 
pronoun hän, but the determinative se (correspond-
ing to Latin is), whereas in line 9, we meet the normal, 
default case of PRO-drop, when the father repeats the 
child’s assurance se keksii, but without any pronoun: kek-
sii jotakin.
What are we supposed to make of this? Assuming that 
the pronoun se has its true determinative value, one could 
surmise that the first mention of the traveling cousin had 
something of the same negative tinge to it that was iden-
tified above (the father thinking of the cousin as a person 
not really interested in buying the boy a gift). However, 
the fluent use of se in the child’s reply and the father’s 
confirmation of this seem to indicate that the expressions 
with and without se, while equivalent in referential value, 
also are very close semantically and connotation-wise. 
The pronoun se has simply lost its independent deno-
tational character in the colloquial use attested here; it 
simply functions as a substitute for the personal pronoun 
(in fact, using hän here would sound a bit pompous and 
over-correct, especially in the child’s reply, whereas the 
father, too, seems quite happy either using se, or go PRO-
dropping and use nothing at all.
As to se, it is reduced from a ‘full’ pronoun to a substi-
tute for a pronoun (which already itself had been reduced 
to semi-autonomous status; as Meillet remarks:
“… ces petits mots [je, tu, elle,…] n’existent plus d’une 
façon indépendante et ne se rencontrent qu’avec le 
verbe;…” (‘these small words do not exist any longer 
in an independent way and are not found except in 
connection with the verb”; Meillet 1937: 440).
In this way, se fully qualifies for ‘grammaticalized’ status 
according to Meillet’s definition of the process by which 
words, along with their autonomy, “lose their proper 
meaning and become grammatical tools” (ibid.).6
A Chinese footnote
I am not familiar with Chinese, so the following remarks 
may serve as hints, rather than as observations or pos-
tulates. In contemporary Mandarin, as the Taiwan-
ese linguist Shuanfan Huang has convincingly shown, 
the demonstrative pronoun has started to function as a 
way-stage towards the development of a definite article 
(which Chinese and European grammarians tradition-
ally have asserted does not exist in Chinese). The context 
for this development, according to Huang, is “interac-
tional referring”, which triggers an evolution of the dis-
tal demonstratives to full-blown definite articles, in fact 
a functional change that results in a true grammaticaliza-
tion. As Huang remarks,
6 Meillet does not mention the term ‘grammaticalization’ here, but the ten-
dency is clear. Compare also another quote from Meilllet, describing gram-
maticalization as “l’attribution du caractère grammatical à un mot jadis 
autonome” (‘the attribution of grammatical character to a formerly auton-
omous word’; Meillet 1958). The quote is found in Hopper and Traugott 
(2003: 19); see the review by Visconti (2006).
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“it is those interactional meanings that form the 
foundation of the grammaticized uses of the devel-
oping definite article in spoken Chinese. In particu-
lar,… the definite determiner is found to regularly 
emerge in interactional contexts where the speaker 
has reason to believe the identity of a referent to 
be community shared knowledge s/he can exploit” 
(Huang 1999: 79)
What this means for us, referring back to the Czech 
and Finnish examples cited above, is one, that these 
developments so far only have taken place in the spoken 
language; the written standards as defended by the gram-
marians and the ‘keepers of the word’ still adhere to the 
traditional view that the languages mentioned do not 
possess articles (or other definite determiners) in regular, 
default usage. The interactional aspect that Huang cites 
for modern Mandarin is especially interesting because 
it gives us another motivation to consider the develop-
ments outlined here as truly pragmatic phenomena, 
developed in a context that is typically characterized by 
the interaction between users of language, rather than in 
discussions between linguists and grammarians.
Conclusion
I started out by referring to the ‘life of words’ as a prag-
matic matter, one that comprises, but not exclusively, a 
historical development in the sense of a ‘history of words’, 
or even of sounds. Here, it behooves us to reflect on the 
very term ‘comparative grammar’, as it has been tradition-
ally understood as the study of the sound correspond-
ences between various languages, in the perspective of 
drawing up family resemblances and genealogical ‘trees’.
The study of grammar, taken in its widest sense as the 
way to use language correctly and effectively, unites the 
grammarian and the pragmaticist in one common goal. 
This goal has not been pursued too assiduously, neither 
in the historical nor in the structural tradition, even 
though lately, typological studies have begun to fill the 
gap that had been left open by both comparativists and 
strict structuralists.
As to the historical dimension, in particular the moti-
vation behind language changes such as semantic bleach-
ing and grammaticalization, the subject was broached by 
Meillet in many of his works, but not pursued further by 
him. Still, questions of language development as an his-
torical process cannot be separated from the ontologi-
cal development of language in the individual human, 
an insight that Meillet already possessed over a hundred 
years ago, but to which others, including myself, have 
come only relatively late in life.
In a pragmatic perspective, studies of grammar, and 
(especially) of the users of grammar, can profit from 
asking questions such as why a particular language has 
developed the way it did, or how a particular develop-
ment in a language has taken place. But I can also see 
why such questions were deemed anathema by most 
historical linguists, and how they were perverted by the 
structuralists to fit in with their preconceived notions 
of how language works, with labeling taking the place of 
understanding.
I recall the shock and awe I experienced sixty years ago, 
upon reading, in Meillet’s Introduction, how “every time 
a child begins to speak, he introduces some innovations” 
(1937: 19; my translation). At the time, I objected not 
only to the issue being raised, but to its being raised in 
this context, at that by a savant like Antoine Meillet, who 
was famous for his work in ‘serious’, that is, comparative 
linguistics. For me, as a burgeoning structuralist, children 
and their imagined innovations simply had no place in 
that universe of studies. But Meillet, on the same page 19 
of his Introduction, unabashedly expands his views and 
clearly states that: “such innovations are the beginnings 
of language development and change”, and goes on to say:
“[l’enfant] ne reçoit pas des autres des procédés 
d’articulation:… il ne reçoit pas des paradigmes 
grammaticaux: il recrée chaque forme sur le modèle 
de celles qu’on emploie autour de lui,…”
‘[The child] does not inherit articulatory procedures 
or grammatical paradigms; he re-creates every form 
according to the model of the forms that people 
around him use,…’ (Meillet 1937: 19)
I can still trace the contours of the word ‘nonsense!’ 
that I wrote in the margin of my copy of Meillet’s book!
If Meillet were around in our times, he would definitely 
reject any theory built upon ‘innate categories’ or sys-
tems, be they phonetic or grammatical. One could not 
imagine a more consistent rejection of all forms of hypo-
thetical constructs à la the Chomskyan ‘LAD’ than the 
one given by Meillet in the quotation above. For Meillet, 
as for Virgil, words develop, grow, and in fact live, for a 
reason; that is, they ‘are about things’ (sunt verba rerum). 
At the end of the day, words (and in general, languages) 
are anchored in their use by the users, not in hypotheti-
cal constructs by linguists. By writing this article, I hope 
to have made a modest contribution to a pragmatically-
inspired understanding of this ‘life of words’, and of how 
our words have come to be, and are, about the things we 
associate with them.
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